A fit, young woman is admitted to hospital for a routine minor surgical procedure carried out under a general anaesthetic. Twenty-four hours later she has died as the result of a series of incompetent reactions to a perfectly manageable complication. A physically fit and active self-employed builder undergoes removal of a benign swelling on the side of his neck under local anaesthetic. Six months later, as a result of accessory nerve injury, he is incapable of work on account of intractable pain and weakness in his shoulder and arm.
Such is the stuff of surgical and many other medical catastrophes, often featuring in Coroners’ courts, litigation and the media. Yet in very few of these cases and others of similar nature, did the clinicians involved set out to do harm. Or behave in a purposefully reckless manner. In fact, they were intending precisely the opposite; they were trying to make their patients better.
Medical intervention invariably involves a degree of risk. Ensuring that such risk is minimised is a sine qua non for ‘high quality’ care. To emphasise its importance, the concept of ‘Patient Safety’ is widely applied to this aspect of healthcare.
Where and how does CORESS relate to patient safety? Almost invariably, a full-blown catastrophe can trace its origins back through a number of near-miss or low harm incidents, known as ‘precursors’. This is of course true for all human systems and not just healthcare. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of detecting and paying heed to such precursors. Neglect to do so manifests as highly visible medical accidents and litigation such as described in the initial paragraph. But if as a result of detection and reporting timely action is taken, many tragedies can be prevented.
Compared with other high stakes operations such as Aviation and Nuclear power, where a ‘no blame’ and ‘just culture’ has been the norm for decades, the reporting of precursor events in UK healthcare is poor – indeed, it could be described as woefully so. The reasons behind this are multifactorial, but the lack of a secure, confidential and trusted portal, independent of employers or regulators is important. It was for this reason that in 2005, the Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland (ASGBI), concluded that there was an urgent need to improve the manner in which precursors were detected and used.
They adapted, for use by surgical teams, a system which had been operating successfully in Aviation and Marine since the mid 1970s. This is ‘The Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP)’. In brief this elicits reports of precursor events that otherwise go undetected and ‘under the radar’. The key feature is the separation of reporting, analysing and feedback systems from any connection with the employer or regulator – and to preserve absolute confidentiality.
It has been shown and long accepted in Aviation and elsewhere, that fear of reprisal deters staff from reporting incidents to in-house systems which may show them in a poor light. Furthermore, that when reporting/feedback systems are clearly separate from employers, the reporting rate increases. To attract confidential reports of near-miss and low harm events CHIRP successfully developed the concept of a third party, separate from any outside agencies, which acts as an ‘Honest Broker’.
Reports received by CORESS are analysed, and the learning published regularly to a wide audience as a series of illustrative feedback cases or vignettes. Where system design or equipment problems are implicated, CORESS relays the dis-identified information to the appropriate regulator.
In operation since 2005 (registered as a charity 1134175 in 2009) CORESS is embarking on a programme of expansion. Although, due to the qualitative nature of its work, it is not possible to measure the Programme’s effectiveness in forestalling specific major harm events, there are a number of surrogate markers which indicate a) that it does have an impact on surgical behaviours and systems and b) that the system’s potential is under exploited.
Surveys have shown that CORESS is a recognised ‘brand’ and that its outputs (feedback reports) are read and assimilated by at least 50% of its target audience. To date the programme has not had the resources to publish independently and improve its circulation, although there has been a steady increase in the number of journals wishing to carry its reports. Furthermore, the experience of CORESS has been used by Government in its approaches to Patient Safety initiatives and specifically the introduction of the Health Services Safety Investigation Agency (HSSIB) – with whom CORESS has established formal links.
Twenty-five years of well-received, successful operation in General Surgery and its subspecialties suggests there is a strong case for more widespread application of the CORESS approach to other medical disciplines. The programme has been adopted successfully by the Royal College of Ophthalmology but there is scope for it to be made available for the 8 other defined UK surgical specialties and an extensive range of medical specialties.
The Trustees have conducted a careful review of the performance of CORESS and the case for its further development. Concluding that it would be in the interests of patient safety and the programme’s charitable purposes, CORESS is embarking on a programme of development. This will comprise four main objectives:
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- Improving the reporting of precursor and other events
- Increasing the circulation of CORESS feedback reports
- Active ‘marketing’ of the programme for adaptation and use of other medical disciplines.
- Contributing to or initiating other activities which promote a Patient Safety Culture in UK healthcare (e.g. occasional publications, training courses, etc.) The first step will be to appoint an administrator and office facilities.